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2ABSTRACT
This paper examines the likelihood that the United States would engage in a policy of exchange 
rate stabilization with the EMU.  First, it examines the history of the exchange rate regimes in 
the United States and a review of literature on exchange rate theories.  From a historical 
perspective, most literature and prominent economic theories focus on the Milton Friedman 
proposal of floating exchange rate regimes.  Just as floating exchange rates were gaining 
prominence in the United States during the 1970s, European countries were attempting to 
compose a currency union which took the form of the European Monetary System in the late 
1970s and eventually evolved into Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union which completed its 
last stage of development January 1, 1999.  The importance of fixed exchange rate regimes and 
theories, most notably, Robert Mundell’s Theory of Optimal Currency Area is highlighted.  In 
addition, the paradigm arguments on the relation between trade integration and synchronization 
of business cycles are discussed utilizing Paul Krugman and Tony Venables’ specialization 
hypothesis (1996) and comparing it to Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose’ endogeneity hypothesis
(1998).  Second, this analysis shows that the United States’ economy is at a critical point in time 
in which it must reevaluate its stance on floating exchange rates.  Particular attention is paid to 
current economic conditions in the United States and the EMU such as: the purchasing power of 
the euro with respect to the U.S. dollar, the recent decline of the dollar, the lackluster 
performance of the EMU with regard to some macroeconomic variables, and the profligate 
spending by the U.S. government which has contributed to the tremendous budget deficit.  Third, 
this paper analyzes six properties of optimal currency area criteria: degree of economic openness, 
trade integration and similarity of economic structure, financial market integration, 
synchronization of business cycles, price flexibility, and mobility of labor as a factor of 
production.  The countries of France and Germany are utilized as benchmarks (if they satisfy the 
criterion) against which the United States and EMU are compared.  The time periods of (1946-
1972) and (1973-2003) are utilized to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of various 
exchange rate regimes and to try and shed light on the endogeneity hypothesis and specialization 
hypothesis.  This thesis concludes that France and Germany failed to satisfy certain OCA criteria 
such as business cycle synchronization, price flexibility, and mobility of labor as a factor of 
production.  Although France and Germany did not fulfill all of the OCA properties, the United 
States and the EMU appear to be farther from optimality, only satisfying mobility of labor as a 
factor of production.  Finally, according to this paper neither the endogeneity hypothesis nor the 
specialization hypothesis dominates.  Therefore, the United States should not stabilize rates with 
the EMU because it will most likely incur greater costs than benefits since it does not form an 
optimal currency area with the EMU.  Intermediate exchange rate policies should be evaluated 
and further research conducted to enhance OCA criteria and make it a more scientific and 
effective tool for policymakers.  The findings of this paper shed light on the history of exchange 
rate regimes, exchange rate theories, and current economic conditions that warrant a reevaluation 
of the United States’ foreign exchange rate position while at the same time indicating which 
characteristics of the U.S. economy satisfy optimality and emphasizing the importance of further 
research in this field. 
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7I. INTRODUCTION
Long-standing research and general economic consensus have conceded to the belief that 
flexible exchange rates and greater monetary independence are beneficial for developed 
economies.  The flexible exchange rate regime instituted in the United States in 1973 made it 
possible for the Federal Reserve to lower the interest rate eleven times in 2001 in order to 
increase the money supply to combat the recession.  Just as the U.S. benefited from a flexible 
exchange rate, countries that attempted to peg their currency suffered.  When Argentina 
instituted “convertibility” (a very hard peg with a zero rate of crawl), the country initially 
experienced growth, only to be undone by a recession and deflation period which led to a 
massive run on the banking system and the currency (Fronti, Miller, and Zhang, 2004).1
Likewise, Mexico spent $25BN in reserves and borrowed $25BN more to defend the peso in 
1994 (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).  Huge capital losses resulting from speculative attacks on 
pegged exchange rates reiterated the long-held belief that flexible exchange rates are the policy 
of the future.  The advent of the euro in January of 1999 marked a watershed event for economic 
monetary policy and a possible resurgence of fixed exchange rate regimes for developed 
countries.  Not only did the introduction of the euro bring into question the exchange rate system 
in the U.S., but current economic conditions such as the depreciating dollar and the increasing 
globalization of economies make the U.S. speculate about various exchange rate regimes.  
This study determines whether the U.S. and Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) should engage in stabilization of the euro-dollar exchange rate in the future.  This paper
analyzes the history of exchange rates, paying particular attention to the demise of fixed 
1
 Emerging markets are not the only ones to suffer from fixed exchange rate vulnerabilities.  In September of 1992, 
the Bank of England had a capital loss of $5BN in an effort to prevent the collapse of the pound (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1995).  
8exchange rates after the Bretton Woods system.  Prominent exchange rate theories proposed by 
Milton Friedman (1953) and Robert Mundell (1963) and the associated advantages and 
disadvantages of alternative regimes are discussed.  The endogeneity hypothesis (Frankel and 
Rose, 1998) and the specialization hypothesis (Krugman and Venables, 1996) are highlighted to 
determine the relation between trade integration and synchronization of business cycles.  Finally, 
this analysis looks at the current economic conditions of the United States and Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union.  
To determine how far the United States is from a situation that would call for exchange 
rate stabilization of some sort, the Inter-European economies of France and Germany are 
compared to the United States and the EMU for two time periods; Bretton Woods System (1946 
– 1972) and Post-Bretton Woods System (1973-2003).  Two different time periods were utilized 
to examine how changes in policy regimes affect exchange rates and to test the endogeneity 
hypothesis and the specialization hypothesis.  By utilizing Mundell’s criteria for optimal 
currency areas; the correlation between these economies, the degree of trade integration, the 
flexibility of prices and mobility of labor as a factor of production, and the synchronization of 
their business cycles are determined. Opponents of fixed exchange rate regimes argue insofar 
that France and Germany would not have satisfied the OCA theory as set forth by Mundell.  This 
thesis aims to determine whether or not France and Germany satisfied the criteria for an optimal 
currency area and if a monetary union between these countries enhanced business cycle 
synchronization or hindered it.  If France and Germany satisfied the OCA criteria and if these 
countries benefited from the implementation of the euro by increased correlation between 
business cycles, Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union can be viewed as a success and France 
and Germany will be utilized as benchmarks when examining the United States and the EMU.  
9In beginning this analysis, the conjecture was that the United States and the EMU were 
further away from an optimal currency area than France and Germany, which would not lead to a 
fixed exchange rate regime, but perhaps an intermediate arrangement. This analysis purports that 
France and Germany did not satisfy all of the criteria for an optimal currency area.  Therefore, 
the monetary union that France and Germany participate in cannot always be utilized in the 
analysis as benchmarks to compare the United States to Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union.
The main findings in this thesis conclude that France and Germany are poo r indicators of an 
optimal currency area and the United States’ business cycle is not highly correlated enough with 
the EMU’s business cycle to warrant a fixed exchange rate arrangement.  
History of Exchange Rate Regimes in the United States
Exchange rate regimes in the United States have changed drastically throughout the years.  
The United States participated in five major exchange rate regimes: Bimetallism, Classical Gold 
Standard, Interwar Period, Bretton Woods System, and Post-Bretton Woods System (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2004).  These regimes reveal a trend from a fixed rate policy to a floating one.  Prior 
to 1875, Bimetallism occurred in which both gold and silver were used for international 
payments.  Therefore, the exchange rates were determined by the gold or silver content of the 
currencies.  This system was replaced in 1875 by the Classical Gold Standard which lasted until 
1914.  Unlike during Bimetallism when the content of the currency determined its value, under 
the Classical Gold Standard governments actually fixed the price of their domestic currency in 
terms of gold and committed to buy or sell to anyone at this price.  For example, the U.S. dollar 
was defined as 23.5 grains of gold or 371 grains of silver (Johnson and Swoboda, 1973).  During 
World War I and World War II, major currencies suspended conversion of paper currency to 
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gold and imposed embargoes on gold exports.  This policy was known as the Interwar Period and 
lasted from 1914 to 1944.  By the end of WWII countries were experiencing high inflation and 
volatile exchange rate fluctuations.2
The high inflation and exchange rate fluctuations associated with the Interwar Period 
called for a change.  In 1944 at a meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, nation leaders 
decided to fix their currencies to the dollar, which would be fixed to gold.  The intention of the 
Bretton Woods system was to “have a system which would lead to a recovery of world trade and 
which avoided the destabilizing capital flows of the 1920s and 1930s” (Lord Robert Skidelsky, 
1999). Under the Bretton Woods, system which would last from 1946 to 1972, the value of the 
U.S. dollar would be fixed to gold.  Other countries would fix their exchange rates to the U.S. 
dollar, but would be allowed to fluctuate within 1% of the fixed level.  Although Bretton Woods 
preserved a fixed peg of the center currency to gold, it had important characteristics of a 
managed float since the prices of other currencies were allowed to float within a certain level 
(1%).  It is important to note that Bretton Woods was seen as a compromise between the two 
Western world powers, the United States and England (Dervis, 2004).  While the United States 
was primarily concerned with having stable money, given the turmoil of the Great Depression,
England was concerned with monetary independence.  This exchange rate system allowed both 
the United States and England to have a nominal anchor for their exchange rate while it laid 
qualifications that enhanced the independence of central banks.  
The Bretton Woods system was effective, for almost two decades, but the changing U.S. 
current account and money supply in the late 1960s led to its collapse (Eichengreen, 2004).  
During the recession of the late 1960s, the United States expanded its money supply to stimulate 
2 In 1923, Germany experienced hyperinflation in which their inflation rate was 200 billion% (Baldassarri, 
Paganetto and  Phelps, 1992).
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the economy.  By expanding the money supply, the value of the U.S. dollar decreased drastically.  
While other countries in the past had held the dollar because it was pegged to gold and could be 
exchanged for gold, these countries now worried that the dollar would lose value in terms of gold.  
This precipitated a large selling off of the dollar by other countries and a large purchase of gold.  
As Figure 1 indicates, U.S. monetary gold stock decreased from approximately $22BN in 1957 
to $9BN in 1971 while the rest of the world’s monetary gold stock climbed from $15BN in 1957 
to $30BN in 1971 (Eichengreen, 2004).  Not only did the U.S. monetary gold stock decrease 
because countries were exchanging U.S. dollars for gold, but U.S. external dollar liabilities 
increased from $43BN in 1969 to $68BN in 1971 (Eichengreen, 2004).  This fear and 
uncertainty about the value of the dollar forced President Nixon to suspend the convertibility of 
the U.S. dollar to gold in 1971, which led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.  
Post-Bretton Woods
In the aftermath of Bretton Woods, each country chose either a fixed exchange rate 
policy, an intermediate arrangement, or a floating exchange rate policy.  However, each policy 
had many variations.  Under a fixed exchange rate policy in which the exchange rate of a 
currency is not allowed to fluctuate against another, a country could decide to have a traditional
fixed exchange rate, a currency board, or a currency union.  While a fixed exchange rate meant 
that the exchange rate was constant, a currency board was when by law, currency in circulation is 
entirely backed by foreign reserves of the central bank at the fixed rate, and a currency union was 
when two countries shared a common currency.  Hence, varying types of fixed exchange rate 
policies enabled a country to choose which policy would be most effective.  
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Perhaps, the greatest variation of exchange rate regimes is found in the intermediate 
arrangement category.  Under an intermediate arrangement an exchange rate is neither fixed nor 
free to float.  Intermediate arrangements include: adjustable pegs, crawling pegs, basket pegs, 
and target zones or bands. An adjustable peg is defined as fixing the exchange rate, but without 
any open-ended commitment to resist devaluation or revaluation of the currency.  However, a 
crawling peg corresponds to a pre-announced policy of devaluing the currency each week.  A 
basket peg is when a country ties its currency to a “basket” of other currencies.  Finally, a target 
zone or band is a situation when the government determines the upper and lower bands of the 
value of the currency.  Market forces determine the movements of exchange rates; however 
when the exchange rate threatens to move out of the bounds, the central bank intervenes in the 
market (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneggar, 2002).  Finally, a floating exchange rate policy is one in 
which the exchange rate is determined by the market through supply and demand.  Managed 
floats and free floats are both categorized as floating exchange rate policies even though under a 
managed float market forces determine the exchange rates only most of the time.  Therefore, the 
varying degrees of central bank intervention allow for there to be many types of exchange rate 
policies that combine both floating and fixed aspects.  
Although a great variety of exchange rate systems were employed after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, the idea of a common currency for Europe began as early as the 
1960s.  The political and economic benefits from a common currency would include: facilitation 
of trade between the EU countries, strong growth rates, high levels of employment, and 
elimination of future wars and conflicts (Ministry of Finance).  In 1969, the Member States 
began investigating the possibility of a monetary union in Europe.  A few years later a currency 
cooperation, known as the “currency snake,” was implemented.  Between 1973 and 1977, the 
13
currency snake was in operation and while it was unable to lend any greater stability to the 
economy, it did increase Europe’s ambition to create a currency union.  In 1978, Germany and 
France took the initiative to establish the European Monetary System (EMS) at the Bremen 
Summit.  Under the EMS, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was utilized in which “the 
currencies of the participating countries were tied together by a system of fixed exchange rates, 
known as central parity rates” (Ministry of Finance).  Therefore, the French franc was tied to the 
German mark as early as 1978.  Although these currencies were allowed to fluctuate, if they 
varied too much against another, a central bank would intervene.  In 1988 at the Hannover 
Summit, President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, revived the idea of economic and 
monetary union among the European countries.  The Delors Report and the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) on Economic and Monetary Union eventually led to the Maastricht Treaty, 
better known as the Treaty of European Union.  As laid out by the Treaty, the economic and
monetary union was to be established in three stages and January 1, 1999 was designated as the 
latest point for the beginning of Stage Three.  While the Treaty began officially operating in 
November 1993, some countries such as the United Kingdom and Denmark were granted the 
right to remain outside the monetary union.  Therefore, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system while the United States experimented with managed floats and variations of pegged 
exchange rates, Europe was undergoing its age-old desire to establish an economic and monetary 
union to integrate European economies. 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND EXCHANGE RATE THEORIES
Milton Friedman and Robert Mundell
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Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen’s 1993 book, A Retrospective on the 
Bretton Woods System:  Lessons for International Monetary Reform, describes the introduction 
of the Bretton Woods System, its implementation, and demise.  While the United States was 
under the Bretton Woods system, a number of economic theories pertaining to exchange rate 
policies emerged.  Two of the most famous and well-respected theories are by; Milton Friedman
(1953) and Robert Mundell (1963).  Milton Friedman discussed the advantages of floating 
exchange rates.  According to Friedman, “floating exchange rates have the advantage of 
monetary independence, insulation from real shocks, and a less disruptive adjustment mechanism 
in the face of nominal rigidities.”  Friedman believed that the advantages of floating exchange 
rates were that the country can conduct independent monetary policy, exchange rates could 
adjust automatically to achieve external balance, and floating exchange rate regimes are not 
subject to speculative attacks on the country’s currency.  Friedman’s theory of floating exchange 
rates seems to have shaped the economic views of the twenty-first century.  As Figure 2 reveals, 
choices of exchange rate regimes have changed from 1984 to 1999.  While 64% of countries 
surveyed were under a fixed exchange rate system in 1984, only 38% were under a fixed 
exchange rate system in 1999 (European Central Bank, 2001).  In addition, only 8% of the 
countries in the 1984 survey were independent floats whereas 28% of the countries surveyed in 
1999 had a floating exchange rate policy (European Central Bank, 2001).  Therefore, Friedman’s 
floating exchange rate theory appears to be well-accepted.  
Recent advocates of floating exchange rate regimes include economists: Maurice 
Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff.  Obstfeld and Rogoff’s 1995 paper, “The Mirage of Fixed
Exchange Rates,” describes the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates as one that is 
becoming “moot.”  Obstfeld and Rogoff argue that only small tourist economies or oil 
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sheikdoms can institute a fixed exchange rate policy and that today’s giant world powers would 
not be able to institute a credible exchange rate peg.
While much of the exchange rate debate focuses on either fixing the exchange rate 
system or letting it float, Guillermo Calvo and Frederic S. Mishkin in their paper, “The Mirage 
of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Countries” (2003), believe that the question should 
center on institutional traits in the country.  In particular, emerging markets have different traits 
than developed economies and should be examined carefully when deciding between a fixed or 
floating exchange rate policy.  According to Calvo and Mishkin, the standard framework 
assumes the ability to set up institutions that assure a fixed exchange rate, presumes that a time-
consistent choice is made on the exchange rate regime, and pays no consideration to transaction 
costs and liquidity considerations.  It is evident that the standard model for deciding exchange 
rate policy has shortcomings and does not adequately help emerging market economies.  To 
highlight some of the main issues confronting emerging markets, Calvo and Mishkin identify 
institutional features that are common for emerging markets: “weak fiscal, financial, and 
monetary institutions; currency substitution and liability dollarization: and vulnerability to 
sudden stops of outside capital flows.”  Proponents of fixed exchange rate regimes argue that this 
regime choice is particularly beneficial for emerging markets because it enables the country’s 
currency to be tied to a nominal anchor and gives the economy some stabilization.  Therefore, 
the exchange rate theory is far from over and is still debated.  Just as Calvo and Mishkin state, 
“one exchange rate regime does not fit all (or always).”  
The Theory of Optimal Currency Area
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In contrast to Friedman’s theory, Robert Mundell’s 1961 paper, “A Theory of Optimal 
Currency Areas,” argued that, ideally, economic similarity, not political boundaries, should 
define the geographic area spanned by a common currency.  The principal advantage of an 
optimal currency area would be that it would decrease transaction costs.  However, the greatest 
disadvantage of such a system would be the loss of the shock-absorber properties of flexible 
exchange rates and independent monetary policies.  In this paper, Mundell advocated for a fixed 
exchange rate system between two countries as long as the countries were economically 
integrated and exhibited synchronized business cycles.  He believed that:
the choice between fixed and floating depended on the sources of the shocks, whether real or nominal and 
the degree of capital mobility. In an open economy with capital mobility a floating exchange rate provides 
insulation against real shocks, such as a change in the demand for exports or in the terms of trade, whereas 
a fixed exchange rate was desirable in the case of nominal shocks such as a shift in money demand
(Mundell, 1961).
Mundell is duly noted for several developments of exchange rate theory.  According to Mundell, 
countries experience a trilemma in that they can only choose two of the three following goals:
open capital markets, monetary policy independence, and pegged exchange rates (Figure 3).
During the Bretton Woods System, the United States chose the fixed exchange rate and 
independent monetary policy and therefore, abandoned perfect capital mobility. 
Mundell’s theory of optimal currency area is the primary instrument used in this analysis 
to determine whether the U.S. and Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union should engage in a 
stabilization of the euro-dollar exchange rate in the future.3 In Mundell’s paper, “A Theory of 
Optimal Currency Areas” (1961), he argued against a system of national currencies connected by 
flexible exchange rates.  The alternative that he developed was a system where currencies were 
not defined by national boarders, but by geographic areas in which other criteria were high.  An 
3
 The United States is often believed to be an optimal currency area.  Some economists argue that the United States 
could be divided into the 12 Federal Reserve Districts and the dollar bills bearing the seals of the 12 regional banks 
can be viewed as 12 separate currencies.  The fact that each dollar from the separate districts exchange for one 
another means that they have a permanently fixed exchange rate (Wynne, 1998).
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optimal currency area (OCA) is defined as “a region for which it is optimal to have a single 
currency and a single monetary policy” (Frankel, 1999).  Mundell encouraged fixed exchange 
rates between countries that had similar economic conditions and in which factor mobility was 
high.  He developed four main criteria that must be met for a region to be an optimal currency 
area.  The first criterion is that the countries involved should be exposed to similar sources of 
disturbances (common shocks).  Next, the relative importance of these common shocks should 
be similar (symmetric shocks).  The third criterion states that countries should have similar 
responses to common shocks (symmetric responses).  Finally, if countries are affected by 
country-specific sources of disturbance (idiosyncratic shocks), they need to be able to adjust 
quickly.  The basic idea behind OCA theory is that countries satisfying Mundell’s criteria would 
have similar economies, therefore a common monetary policy response would be optimal. A
country should choose between a fixed and flexible exchange rate system on the basis of the 
economic characteristics of the regions.  Just as Friedman was an advocate of flexible exchange 
rates and their advantages, Mundell believed that fixed exchange rates also had their advantages,
especially when they were used between countries whose domestic financial markets were 
integrated.  Some of the advantages associated with fixed exchange rates were that they reduced 
exchange rate risk, encouraged foreign trade and foreign investment, avoided competitive 
devaluation, and avoided speculative bubbles in the country’s currency.  Each country should 
resolve its own tradeoff between fixed and flexible exchange rates.
Endogeneity Hypothesis vs. Specialization Hypothesis
When deciding whether or not a country should adopt a fixed or flexible exchange rate 
regime, the effects of each regime must be analyzed post-implementation.  According to Figure 4, 
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any country which exhibits a high degree of economic integration and a high correlation of 
business cycles, would likely be above the OCA line and be a good candidate for a common 
currency (Anyanwu, 2002).  In contrast, any country that falls below the OCA line, usually 
exhibiting a low degree of economic integration and a low correlation of business cycles, should 
float independently.  This conventional view of optimal currency area theory has been analyzed 
in depth by economists such as: Paul Krugman, Barry Eichengreen, Tamim Bayoumi, Jeffrey
Frankel and Andrew Rose.  From these economists two opposing views developed regarding the 
costs and benefits from a fixed exchange rate regime and whether or not a country should adopt a 
common currency or freely float.  Bayoumi and Eichengreen, in their paper, “Shocking Aspects 
of European Monetary Unification” (1993), and Krugman and Venables (1996) are advocates of 
the specialization hypothesis.  According to Krugman’s specialization hypothesis, a common 
currency reduces transaction costs, removes obstacles to trade, and encourages economies of 
scale (Krugman, 1993; Krugman and Venables, 1996).  As countries become more integrated,
they will specialize in producing goods and services where they have a competitive advantage 
(Berthola, 1993; Rauch, 1994; and Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1996).  As the participating 
countries in the currency union become more specialized, they will become more vulnerable to 
supply shocks and therefore, their business cycles will become less correlated.  As evidenced in 
Figure 5, an increase in trade integration decreases the correlation of business cycles (incomes) 
and a country would move away from the OCA line, from point A to point B (Anyanwu, 2002).  
Therefore, a fixed exchange rate system may in fact increase specialization and make the 
participating countries worse currency partners.  
A paradoxical argument is raised by Frankel and Rose (1998) who are proponents of the 
endogeneity hypothesis which states that a currency union increases trade integration and 
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correlation of incomes or business cycles.  This positive relationship between economic 
integration and business cycles is rooted in the idea that “monetary integration reduces trading 
costs beyond the elimination of the costs from exchange rate volatility” (Anyanwu, 2002).
Moreover, a commitment for a currency union is viewed as durable and will increase foreign 
direct investment and political integration.  In turn, a country participating in a fixed exchange 
rate regime will benefit from reciprocal trade, economic and financial integration, and business 
cycle synchronization.  As illustrated in Figure 6, countries which are initially at point C will 
likely move to point D once an economic union is implemented since a currency union will 
increase correlation of business cycles (Anyanwu, 2002).  Business cycles will become more 
correlated among countries in a currency union because of the “increasing propensity for partner 
countries to import from each other, from productivity shocks spilling over via trade, or the 
disciplining effect of a monetary exchange rate arrangement” (Frankel and Rose, 1998).  If the 
countries engaged in the economic union were to form a monetary union, this would further 
increase trade integration and correlation of business cycles, moving the countries from point D 
to point E in Figure 6. The opposing hypotheses on the correlation of business cycles and its 
relation to trade integration are still debated, proponents of fixed exchange rate regimes tend to
follow Frankel and Rose’s (1998) endogeneity hypothesis and proponents of floating exchange 
rate regimes follow Krugman and Venable’s (1996) specialization hypothesis.  
III ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
An Overview: The EMU and the Euro
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Although Friedman’s theory of floating exchange rates dominated the last thirty years for 
most developed economies, exchange rate stabilization and the eventual introduction of the euro
in Europe in 1999 brought fixed exchange rates to the forefront of economic policy since the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system.  In a paper by Thomas Courchene and Richard Harris, 
“North American Monetary Union: Analytical Principles and Operational Guidelines” (2000),
the authors argue that the advent of the euro signals both a “de-nationalization” of national 
currency regimes as well as a “progressively integrated global economy that emerged for 
supranational public good.” Mundell recognized that his theory of optimal currency area was 
politically unfeasible because sovereign nations would never abandon their national currencies 
for a single currency.  However, the introduction of the euro has proven that countries could 
abandon their national currencies yet maintain their national identities.  For this reason, Mundell 
has been recognized as the “Father of the Euro.”  
In 1999, Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) composed of 12 countries 
adopted the euro as the national currency.  The adoption of the euro was the last stage of the 
EMU’s creation.  The EMU is the second largest economic power in the world as of 2004 with a 
GDP of over $7 trillion dollars only five years after the euro was introduced (Bernanke, 2004).  
This currency union was the elimination of a long integration process for the countries of 
Europe.  Dating back to 1958, when the European Economic Union was founded in the Treaty of 
Rome, European countries were attempting to increase competition and decrease trade barriers to 
enable Europe to grow through trade. The establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
in 1998 laid the groundwork for a single currency in 1999.  Although the euro was introduced 
then, it was not a currency in circulation until January 2002.  The value of the euro reflects a 
currency union in which the money is interchangeable between the 12 countries so that there is 
21
no need to convert prices when trading.  However, the value of the euro when it was initially 
introduced reflected the value of the basket of national currencies at their exchange rate at that 
given day.  At introduction, the value was fixed by the European Council by a unanimous vote to 
prevent manipulation of exchange rates and to guarantee a fair and sound value of the euro for 
every country. 
While the purchasing power of the euro was the same as that of the national currencies 
when divided by their respective exchange rates, a challenge that did confront these European 
nations was that of denationalization.  By accepting the euro as a national currency and joining 
the EMU, a country would abandon its national currency.  In order for the euro to be widely 
accepted and survive, the benefits of accepting the euro must outweigh the political, economic,
and cultural costs of discarding the national currency.4 The success of the euro and its 
integration into the international realm means that the euro is here to stay.  From 1999 to 2004, 
the average inflation rate of countries who have adopted the euro has been approximately 2%
(European Central Bank, 2001).  The euro is the second most actively traded currency in foreign 
exchange markets worldwide, accounting for 37% of foreign exchange transactions (European 
Central Bank, 2001).  Initially, the euro experienced a low exchange rate ($.87) in the first 
couple of months of circulation, but by 2002 the currency had made significant improvements 
and was valued at $1.14 (European Central Bank, 2001).  A mere five years after its introduction 
roughly 50 countries are utilizing the euro as an anchor or reference currency in their exchange 
rate policies.  Not only is the e uro recognized as stable currency, but it is challenging the U.S. 
dollar and the Japanese yen in international markets. The shares of the euro in international debt 
securities have increased to 31% from less than 20% before the launch of the euro (Ferguson, 
4
 For example, an economic cost associated with adopting the euro would be losing the ability to use monetary 
policy to respond to idiosyncratic shocks.
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2004).  In contrast, both the shares of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen have steadily 
decreased over the 1999 to 2004 time period from 47% to 44% and from 17% to 9%, 
respectively (Ferguson, 2004).  Therefore, although the euro has only been in circulation for 
three years, it is as powerful a currency as the U.S. dollar or Japanese yen.
Some monetary economists believe that eventually there will be at most three common 
currencies worldwide; the dollar, the euro and possibly the yen.  Other theorists predict that in 
the near future a single currency will dominate worldwide.  Recently, Robert Mundell speculated 
about a world currency created by a monetary union of the U.S., the EMU, and Japan (Liesman, 
2003).  Three common currencies, and even more implausible, one common currency, may seem 
unrealistic. However, common currencies are expected to dominate and replace national 
currencies.  Z.A. Spindler in his paper, “Public Choice Perspectives on Monetary Regimes”
(2004), states that common currencies can emerge “either spontaneously, as with unofficial 
dollarization, or as a result of deliberate, national policy, as with official dollarization, the 
creation of the euro or institution of the more recently proposed amero.” While the idea of a 
currency called “amero” may seem incredulous to the average American, there is even 
speculation that an internet-based cyber currency or cyber-money may emerge (Courchene and 
Harris, 2000)  Therefore, the currency and exchange rate policy debate is far from over and may 
even be beginning to resurface as a result of the EMU. 
Performance of the EMU and the Euro
Opponents of stabilizing foreign exchange rates often point to the lackluster performance 
of the Euro-Zone areas.  The introduction of the euro among the 12 countries in Europe was 
ideally supposed to decrease transaction costs, increase trade, increase GDP, decrease inflation, 
23
and decrease unemployment.  However, when comparing such macroeconomic variables to 
competitor countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, it becomes evident that 
Euro-Zone areas have not superseded other countries in macroeconomic performance, and have 
even significantly lagged other countries in some aspects.  Table 1 reveals the macroeconomic 
performance of the Euro-Zone compared to the United Kingdom and United States from 1986 to 
2001 across such variables as: GDP growth (%), Inflation (annual rate, %), Unemployment Rate 
(%), and Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (Talani, 2002).  There are three main conclusions 
which can be drawn from this data.  First, across all variables, the Euro-Zone’s performance has 
appeared to be quite volatile and fluctuate dramatically.  From 1986 to 1995, the Euro-Area’s 
GDP growth decreased from 3.4% to 1.6%, only to rise again in 2000 to 3.4% and then to fall 
again in 2001 to 2.8% (Talani, 2002).  This fluctuating performance is indicative of the other 
macroeconomic variables for this time period.  Therefore, no time trend correlation exists.  
Second, the Euro-Zone with the united currency and stabilization policy does not exhibit 
causality with high performance.  Proponents of fixed exchange rate policies have long held the 
belief that a stabilization policy directly correlates with higher GDP growth, lower inflation, and 
lower unemployment.  As evidenced in Table 1, the Euro-Zone does have the highest GDP 
growth (2.8%), yet this GDP growth is not significantly higher than the United Kingdom’s 
(2.7%) to conclude that a common currency is correlated with high GDP growth (Talani, 2002).  
In addition, the Euro-area has the highest unemployment rate (8.5%) which is significantly 
higher than the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s which are 4.6% and 5.3%, respectively
(Talani, 2002).  Likewise, the Euro-zone’s inflation at 2.3% is not as low as the United 
Kingdom’s which is at 1.8% (Talani, 2002).  Thus, the fixed exchange rate regime followed by 
most countries in Europe has not appeared to act as a competitive advantage.  However, the third 
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conclusion which can be drawn from this data is that although the Euro-zone has fluctuating 
performance and lags certain countries, there is some evidence that performance may be 
improving.  In 1995, the Euro-zone’s GDP growth was at 1.6% and in 2001 the GDP growth was 
at 2.8% (Talani, 2002).  The Euro-area’s inflation decreased from 3.7% in 1995 to 2.3% in 2001
(Talani, 2002).  Finally, the Unemployment Rate decreased from 10.2% in 1995 to 8.5% in 2001
(Talani, 2002).  Therefore, proponents of stabilizing exchange rates compare the Euro-zone to its 
past performance whereas opponents of fixed exchange rate regimes compare the Euro-zone’s 
performance to other countries.  From this analysis it becomes evident that even though 12 
countries in Europe have united under a fixed monetary system, the success of the Euro-zone 
continues to be quite controversial.  
The debatable success of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union may be a direct result 
of the countries participating in the currency union and their seemingly lack of optimality 
criteria.  According to a paper by Martin Feldstein, “The European Central Bank and The Euro: 
The First Year” (2000), cyclical and inflation conditions vary significantly among the 12 
participating countries such that a “one size fits all” monetary policy is not suitable.  Feldstein 
(2000) analyzed the euro one year after its introduction and concludes:
The value of the euro has declined by about 15 percent during the year relative to the dollar and even more 
relative to the yen.  The European economy remained weak and unemployment remained at more than 
twice the level in the United States.  The counterproductive tax and social benefit policies, the excessive 
regulations, and the anti-business policies of the governments in both France and Germany have 
contributed to both of these poor measures of performance.
Although Feldstein’s conclusion appears quite premature considering current knowledge in 
which the euro is in fact stronger than the U.S. dollar, Feldstein’s theory is pertinent.  The hype 
that surrounded the introduction of the euro as a “strong new player in the global economy” was 
somewhat thwarted by the depressing economic performance of the euro in 2000.  Since the full 
success of the EMU and the euro is uncertain, opponents of currency unions argue that “the euro 
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is likely to have adverse medium-term and long-term effects on employment and inflation and is 
likely to be the source of political conflicts within Europe and between Europe and the United 
States” (Feldstein, 2000).  The uncertain merit of the euro and the EMU is caused by the 
participating countries who some economists believe lack the essential optimality criteria as 
proposed by Mundell.  
According to Feldstein, variations in demand, immobility of labor, and weighted averages 
of the European economy contributed to the depressing economic performance of the euro.  In 
1999, Spain, Portugal and Ireland experienced very strong demand while Germany and Italy had 
relatively weak demand.  The result of these idiosyncratic shocks was extremely high inflation 
for Spain and Ireland which threatened their competitiveness and hindered their new-found 
prosperity.  It is important to note that these strong variations in demand among the 12 
participating countries in the EMU are not likely to subside.  As a result of differing industrial 
composition and varying economic policies, disparities of demand will most likely persist among 
individual countries. Not only must demand shocks be symmetric for regions to be considered 
optimal currency areas, but mobility of labor must be high.  Although the countries in Europe are 
geographically in close proximity, they reveal an immobility of labor due to barriers of language 
and custom.  Finally, the European Central Bank conducts monetary policy for “Europe as a 
whole” and thereby, uses weighted averages of the European participating countries.  While this 
monetary policy may be appropriate for France, Germany, and Italy since they have the largest 
GDPs, it would be inappropriate for countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland.  This 
ineffective monetary policy, which fails to adequately govern smaller economies, has caused the 
Maastricht inflation principle to become violated which states that “the inflation rate of each 
country must not exceed the average of the lowest three countries by more than 1.5%” 
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(Feldstein, 2000).  Therefore, the controversial success of the EMU and the euro hinges on the 
notion that the participating countries may in fact not meet Mundell’s Optimal Currency Area 
theory.  
The Recent Behavior of the U.S. Dollar
Not only did the advent of the euro spurn interest in fixed exchange rate regimes and 
currency unions, but the depreciating U.S. dollar leads some to suspect a currency crisis is 
imminent.  According to Mundell, the U.S. dollar’s decline and the large current-account deficit 
are particularly worrisome:
The current-account deficit has been hovering around record levels, north of 5% of gross domestic product.  
In dollar terms, it’s about half a trillion dollars annually, or about $1,800 for every American.  All of that 
adds up to our cumulative U.S. debt outstanding to the rest of the world.  That was a problem in the 1980s, 
but it’s worse now because in the ‘80s, the U.S. was a net creditor country and now it is a debtor country.  
The U.S. debt is something like $3 trillion, almost 30% of gross domestic product.  So this is a major 
problem, not immediately, and not this current cycle, but it’s a problem people will be anticipating over the 
next few years.  What it means is that as a percentage of GDP, it will be 35% next year, eventually 40% 
and then at some point it is an accident waiting to happen – a big international crisis (Liesman, 2003).
A crisis in the value of the dollar could lead to big changes in the international monetary system.  
While creating an optimal currency area among the U.S., the EMU, and Japan may be difficult,
many proponents of optimal currency theory predict the U.S. and the EMU as greater optimal 
currency areas (Ferguson, 2004).  In comparing the U.S. dollar to the euro from 2000 to 2004, 
exchange rates have been extremely volatile.  Monthly average exchange rates have dipped as 
low as $.86 per euro (2000, 2001) and as high as $1.3047 per euro (Yahoo Finance, 2004).  It is 
important to note that from 2000 to early 2002, the exchange rate between the dollar and the euro 
exhibited serial correlation and an estimated constant mean of approximately $.90 per euro
(Yahoo Finance, 2004).  From the middle of 2002 to 2004, the data exhibits a time trend in 
which the exchange rate is steadily increasing.  This is particularly worrisome for the United 
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States’ economy because a depreciating dollar causes imports in Europe to increase in value and 
hence, become more expensive to Americans while exports to Europe decrease in value, and 
become less expensive to Europeans.  A depreciating dollar increases U.S. exports abroad; 
however leaves the U.S. with a trade deficit.
The United States is not taking an active stance, with respect to the dollar’s sharp decline,
but a laissez-faire approach.  In a Financial Times article, “Dollar Hits New Low vs. Euro,” U.S. 
Treasury Secretary, John Snow, stated that coordinated action to stem the dollar’s decline was 
still some way off even as the exchange rate dipped to $1.3030 per euro (Ferguson, 2004).  The 
bearish dollar is becoming a topic of great concern in foreign central banks which may reduce 
their holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds.  According to an Economist article, “The Future of the 
Dollar: The Passing of the Buck,” the dollar’s share of global foreign-exchange reserves has 
already fallen from 80% in the mid-1970s to around 65% today.  In order for a currency to 
become a reserve currency certain criteria must be met.  The currency must have a large 
economy, low inflation, confidence in the value of the currency, and open and deep financial 
markets.  The euro-area may be surpassing the United States as a reserve currency economy.  
Not only is the euro area’s economy not that much smaller than America’s, but the EMU is the 
world’s biggest exporter and the EMU’s financial markets have become very deep and liquid.  
Unlike the EMU which is a net creditor, the United Sates has become a net debtor.  The main 
fear is that the debtor would use devaluation to reduce its deficit.  Indeed, the heart of the issue 
lies in the profligate spending by the U.S. government which has led to a tremendous account 
deficit.  As foreign central banks worry about the value of their dollar reserves, they may have to 
buy more and more dollars in order to maintain the current value of dollar assets.  This increase 
in dollar assets only increases currency risks for foreign central banks who should be 
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diversifying their reserves; which could lead to the downfall of the dollar.  According to the 
Department of Commerce, U.S. net foreign assets as a percentage of GDP has decreased 
dramatically from almost 10% in 1982 to approximately -30% in 2004 (Figure 7).  Ultimately, 
the current-account deficit cannot be corrected by a fall in the dollar alone and other factors such 
as savings need to mitigate the deficit.  A failure to cut the deficit will inevitably lead to a sharp 
decline in the dollar and a likely recession.
Mundell believes that the United States is not far from a stabilization of rates and can 
benefit from a number of advantages.  Some advantages associated with a stabilization of the
dollar and the euro would be: reduced transaction costs, enhanced competition, price 
transparency, lower real interest rates, and anti-inflation strategy by joint central banks.  
Although it is highly unlikely that the United States would abandon the national currency and 
adopt the euro, an important question is how far away is the United States from coordinating 
actions with the EMU to stabilize rates.  Followers of the Friedman view believe that the United 
States is quite far from stabilizing rates whereas followers of the Mundell theory believe that a 
stabilization or coordination of sorts is in the near future.  The analysis that follows tests this 
question and attempts to determine which group (Friedman vs. Mundell) is correct.
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY / METHODOLOGY
To test the likelihood of stabilization in exchange rate regimes between the United States and 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, this study utilizes Professor Mundell’s optimal 
currency area theory and the associated criteria.  The basic idea behind OCA theory is that 
countries should coordinate policy or join currency unions with other countries that exhibit 
synchronized business cycles, a high degree of trade integration, and flexible factors of 
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production.  The analysis investigates the correlation among certain OCA properties between 
Germany and France and the U.S. and the EMU during two time periods: Bretton Woods System 
(1946-1972) and Post-Bretton Woods (1973-2004).  Although Germany and France hav e elected 
to join the EMU, the OCA criteria may not be satisfied.  This study tests the OCA theory using 
France and Germany as benchmarks and compares the synchronization of their business cycles 
and overall economy to that of the United States’ and the EMU’s.  The true test will be whether 
or not the economies between the U.S. and the EMU are synchronized enough (compared to 
France and Germany’s) to be viewed as an optimal currency area.  
Two different time periods are utilized to reveal if the economies have changed since the 
demise of Bretton Woods in such a way to make stabilization optimal.  Germany and France 
were chosen as benchmarks because both of these countries were two of the founding members 
of the EMU and provided leadership in its development.  By using the Inter-European economies 
of Germany and France as benchmarks for the U.S. / EMU economies, this study reveals which 
areas of the business cycle between the U.S. and EMU are coordinated and how far the U.S. is 
from abandoning its laissez-faire exchange rate policy to stabilize rates.
Optimal Currency Area Criteria / Properties
To determine the business cycle synchronization, degree of trade integration, flexibility 
of prices, and mobility of labor as a factor of production, six OCA properties are investigated.  
These properties include: degree of economic openness, trade integration and similarity of 
economic structures, financial market integration, price flexibility, and mobility of labor as a 
factor of production.
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Degree of economic openness is one of the most important properties in this analysis.  
The higher the openness, the more the domestic rate of inflation is determined by the prices of 
internationally traded goods.  Also, the higher the degree of openness, the less useful an 
independent exchange rate policy becomes to affect changes in relative prices and 
competitiveness.  The degree of economic openness can be measured by the amount of exports 
and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.
Not only must a high degree of trade exist between the two countries, but the trade must 
be integrated and the economic structures must be similar.  If trade is integrated and economic 
structures are similar within a group of countries, these countries are less likely to be subject to 
asymmetric shocks and their business cycles are more likely to be synchronized.  To measure 
trade integration between countries, this analysis measures the percentage share of France and 
Germany in the exports of the U.S. and compared it to the percentage share of the U.S. in the 
exports of France and Germany.  The similarity of economic structures was measured using: 
Labor Force, percentage change in Labor Force, Unemployment Rate, and Employment 
Contribution among main sectors of production.
Financial market integration is important in the optimal currency theory because if assets 
can be transferred between countries, it can smooth the impact of idiosyncratic shocks.  There 
are a number of ways to assess financial market integration.  In this analysis financial market 
integration is measured by: Federal Funds Rate, and the percentage of GDP that constitutes 
Foreign Direct Investment.
Since the synchronization of business cycles is the basis for establishing an optimal 
currency area, this study includes this criterion in the analysis.  When business cycles are 
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synchronized, there is less of a need for an independent monetary policy to smooth the cycles.  
Business cycle harmonization can be easily measured by GDP and percentage change of GDP.
When prices are flexible and can adjust quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, an independent 
monetary policy is less useful.  To measure this criterion, prices and percentage change in prices
(inflation) are analyzed.
Finally, mobility of labor as a factor of production is essential for a region to be 
recognized as an optimal currency area because the greater the mobility of labor between 
countries, the faster a country experiencing an idiosyncratic shock can adjust.  The greater the
mobility of labor, the less useful an independent exchange rate policy becomes.  Mobility of 
labor is measured by the number of Europeans moving to the U.S. and the number of U.S. 
citizens moving to Europe.
V. EVIDENCE
Data Limitations
It is important to note that two time periods are used in this analysis (1946-1972) and 
(1973-2003), wherever possible.  In some cases, information dating back past the 1970s is not 
retrievable, and therefore, only a (1970-2003) comparison can be made.  In addition, some data 
on the EMU are not accessible; in this case a composite average of France and Germany’s data 
are utilized as a substitute for the EMU.  In this study, whenever the composite index of France 
and Germany are used in place of the EMU, no distinction is made and the index is just referred 
to as the EMU.  This notation is used to make the analysis more clear and understandable.  
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However, the individual tables and figures do distinguish between purely EMU data and the 
composite index. The main sources of information in this study come from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF International Financial 
Statistics, and the Migration Information Source, Global Data as well as other pertinent research 
papers and studies.
Assumptions
Since France and Germany were the founding members of the EMS which eventually 
became Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, it is essential to determine whether or not 
France and Germany satisfied Mundell’s optimal currency area criteria.  If France and Germany 
did satisfy all of these criteria they would exhibit predictable co-movements (high correlations) 
among business cycle characteristics (GDP, interest rates, and inflation), high degrees of trade 
integration, and high mobility of labor as a factor of production.  If France and Germany satisfied 
any criterion, they would be utilized as a benchmark to compare the United States’ economy to 
the EMU’s. For all of the criteria that France and Germany did not satisfy, the United States and 
EMU would be analyzed comparatively against France and Germany.  
The two time periods under study occurred during different exchange rate regimes for 
France and Germany.  From (1946-1972) France and Germany’s currencies were tied to the 
United States’ dollar which was fixed to gold (Bretton Woods System).  This fixed exchange rate 
regime would likely exhibit high correlations among business cycle characteristics, high degrees 
of trade integration, and high mobility of labor as a factor of production.  From (1973-2003), 
France and Germany experienced varying regimes.  As early as the 1960s, thoughts about a 
currency union between European countries became relevant.  Although from 1973 to 1978, 
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France and Germany were under independent exchange rate regimes, for all intended purposes,
they seem to have been under a fixed regime since in 1978 the French franc was tied to the 
German mark and ever since these currencies have been under a stabilized monetary policy.  
Therefore, two hypotheses can be purported.  First, France and Germany should have exhibited 
high correlations in terms of macroeconomic performance (OCA criteria) from (1946-1972) in 
order for the countries to satisfy Mundell’s criteria and create a currency union which began as 
early as the 1960s.  Second, since these countries were officially tied together in 1978, the 
correlation between their economies should be greater from the (1973-2003) time period than for 
the (1946-1972) time period.  Guided by the widely-accepted endogeneity hypothesis (Frankel 
and Rose, 1998) which purports that a monetary or currency union exhibits higher degrees of 
correlation across business cycles than merely an economic union, a higher correlation from 
(1973-2003) for France and Germany would appear more likely since during this period these 
countries engaged in a more disciplined monetary exchange rate arrangement.  
If France and Germany met all of the six criteria proposed by Mundell, they would 
constitute an optimal currency area and the United States would be compared to the EMU from 
(1973-2003) utilizing the criteria France and Germany fulfilled.  If France and Germany did not 
fulfill a criterion, these countries would be deemed inadequate for an optimal currency area and a 
different benchmark would have to be utilized for the United States and the EMU.  For business 
cycle characteristics which includes: GDP, percentage changes in GDP, interest rates, and 
inflation rates, a concrete benchmark can be utilized instead of merely the comparative approach.  
Based on a study conducted by Clark and van Wincoop, in their paper, “Borders and Business 
Cycles” (1999), international and intra-national borders are analyzed to determine the effects of 
trade.  According to Clark and van Wincoop, “intra-national business cycle correlations 
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approximate 0.70 for regions within countries.” Since under an optimal currency area, countries 
under one monetary authority can be regarded as regions within a country, it can be argued that 
countries within an optimal currency area should have business cycle characteristics that are 
correlated at least 70% of the time.  When analyzing business cycle properties, if France and 
Germany’s business cycle properties had a correlation of 0.70 or greater for the time period 
(1973-2003), they could be utilized as the benchmark for the United States and the EMU for the 
same time period.  If France and Germany’s business cycle characteristics were not correlated at 
least 70% of the time, the United States would use Clark and van Wincoop’s 0.70 benchmark.  
For the criteria which do not fall under business cycle characteristics, a comparative approach is 
utilized in which trends and plots of data are evaluated using France / Germany data and U.S. / 
EMU data from 1973 to 2003.
Finally, this analysis studies two time periods to determine the validity of the endogeneity 
hypothesis (Frankel and Rose, 1998) and the specialization hypothesis (Krugman and Venables, 
1996).  Two important assumptions are made in this paper.  First, it is assumed that France and 
Germany’s currency union was a more disciplined exchange rate policy than the Bretton Woods 
system.  This is mainly because in 1978 the French franc was pegged to the Deutsche mark while 
under the Bretton Woods system, some fluctuation of exchange rates was allowed.  Second, it is 
assumed that the United States, unlike France and Germany, participated in greater monetary 
independence Post-Bretton Woods (1973).  Therefore, if the business cycle synchronization of 
France and Germany increased from (1946-1972) to (1973-2003) this is evidence of the 
endogeneity hypothesis (increased trade integration from a more stringent exchange rate policy 
increases business cycle synchronization).  Likewise, if the business cycles of France and 
Germany decreased from (1946-1972) to (1973-2003), this is evidence of the specialization 
35
hypothesis.  For the United States, the opposite is true.  An increase in business cycle 
synchronization between the United States and the EMU would be evidence of the specialization 
hypothesis and a decrease in business cycle synchronization would be evidence of the 
endogeneity hypothesis.  
Degree of Economic Openness
One of the primary benefits of a currency union is enhanced trade integration between 
countries.  Two regions of the same country trade significantly more with each other than if an 
international border were to separate them.  Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) estimate that the 
presence of an international border reduces trade among industrialized countries by 30%.  Even 
when there are no explicit trade restrictions in place, national borders tend to be associated with 
different currencies.  The elimination of border costs by having a single currency such as the 
euro might have a positive and significant effect on trade between countries.  In a model by 
Alesina and Barro (2002), it is determined that the adoption of a common currency reduces 
trading costs between two countries such that under reasonable assumptions about elasticities of 
substitution between goods, countries that already have existing trade relations benefit from a 
currency union.  Utilizing this model, Alesina and Barro (2002) conclude:
Countries that trade more with each other stand to gain more from adopting the same currency.  Also, 
smaller countries should, ceteris paribus, be more inclined to give up their currencies.  Hence, as the 
number of countries increases (and their average size shrinks), the number of currencies in the world should 
increase less than proportionately.
Consistent with these findings, France and Germany’s creation of the EMS in 1978 followed by 
the official establishment of the EMU significantly increased trade for Europe as compared to the 
United States.  In order to measure the increased trade from the adoption of the euro, this 
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analysis utilized the degree of economic openness or the percentage of GDP that was comprised 
of exports and imports.  
Although trade was not extremely high among the United States, France, and Germany in 
the (1946-1972) time period, it increased substantially for France and Germany Post-Bretton 
Woods.  As evidenced in Table 2, the average degree of economic openness or percentage GDP 
comprised of exports and imports for the United States, France, and Germany from 1946 to 1972 
was approximately 7.1%, 4.9%, and 7.8%, respectively.  During the Bretton Woods system, the 
United States’ degree of economic openness appeared to be in line with the Inter-European 
countries.  However, the time period (1973-2003) tells a somewhat different story.  Table 2 and 
Figure 8 reveal the shocking changes in the degrees of economic openness between the Inter-
European economies and the United States.  France and Germany’s degree of economic 
openness averaged 65.1% and 23.6% from 1973 to 2003, respectively.  While the United States’ 
degree of economic openness increased during this period as well, it remained at a relatively low 
level comparatively, 15.9%.  The United States’ low degree of economic openness is evident in 
Figure 8 in which the U.S. data is plotted against the EMU data.  The large spread between the 
degrees of economic openness of the U.S. and the EMU indicate that the United States does not 
rely on exports and imports nearly as much as the European countries do to warrant a system of 
fixed exchange rates.    
Trade Integration and Similarity of Economic Structure
Just as the degree of economic openness measures the percentage of a country’s gross 
domestic product that is comprised of exports and imports, trade integration measures the 
percentage of one country’s exports in the imports of the other country.  Therefore, trade 
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integration is a more specific measure of economic openness since it segments a country’s 
imports.  This OCA property, trade integration and similarity of economic structure, seeks to 
determine the exact country or countries that have high trade integration and similar economic 
structures to benefit from a currency union.  Countries that trade more benefit from currency 
unions because a common currency reduces transaction costs, diminishes the risk of exchange 
rate fluctuations, increases bilateral trade, and subjects the participating countries to greater 
symmetric shocks and therefore, more synchronized economies.  According to the “gravity 
model” of trade, countries that trade more have a greater benefit from adopting a common 
currency because trade tends to raise the co-movements of outputs and prices.  The gravity 
model states that “bilateral trade volumes are well explained by a set of geographical and 
economic variables, such as the distance between the two countries, and the sizes and incomes of 
the countries” (Alesina and Barro, 2002).  Trade integration will be measured by the percentage 
of one country’s exports in the imports of the other country and similarity of economic structures 
will be measured using the total labor force, unemployment rate, and the percentage of 
employment among main sectors of production.    
Similar to the degree of economic openness which increased for all countries under study 
during the two time periods, trade integration increased as well.  Data on this criterion was 
mainly gathered from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.  According to Table 3, the 
percentage of Germany’s imports from France increased from an average of 10.4% (1946-1972) 
to an average of 12.2% (1973-2003).   The percentage of France’s imports from Germany 
increased from an average of 12.9% (1946-1972) to an average of 16.7% (1973-2003).  The 
percentage of France and Germany’s imports from the United States decreased from an average 
of 8.5% (1946-1972) to an average of 5.6% (1973-2003).  Finally, the percentage of United 
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States’ imports from France and Germany increased from 6.6% (1946-1972) to 7.4% (1973-
2003).   Not only does this data suggest that France and Germany are more highly integrated 
economies in terms of trade than the United States is with the EMU, but Figures 9 and 10 
indicate that the United States does not trade as extensively with the European countries as the 
European countries do with each other.  It is important to note that trade is an integral element of 
the United States economy and the increased globalization of the U.S. economy, particularly 
with the Asian economies of China and Japan, may mean that France and Germany only 
constitute a small percentage of exports and imports.  More convincing is Figure 10 which plots 
the trend lines for France, Germany, and the United States in terms of trade integration.  
Although all the trend lines follow relatively similar patterns, with sharp increases in the late 
1970s, France and Germany’s trend lines are significantly higher than the United States’.  
Ultimately, the United States does not share a substantial enough amount of imports and exports 
with the EMU to qualify for this criterion of optimality.   
Equally as important as trade, economic structures between optimal currency areas must 
be similar in order for countries to respond symmetrically to similar sources of disturbances 
(common shocks).  To analyze economic structures across various countries three measures will 
be utilized: total labor force, unemployment rates, and percentage of total labor force employed 
in agriculture, industry, and services.  
Total labor force numbers were extracted from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and only date back to 1960.  1960 to 1972 are utilized as the Bretton Woods system.
Table 4 reveals the labor force trends for the United States, France, Germany and the EMU.  As 
depicted in Figure 11, the total labor force between France and Germany varies slightly.  From 
1973 to 2002, both France and Germany exhibit a positive trend line in which total labor force 
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increases steadily.  However, Germany’s total labor force appears to be just shy of doubling 
France’s.  In contrast, the United States and the EMU have a virtually identical labor force 
amount.  From 1973 to 2002, both the United States and the EMU exhibit a steadily increasing 
labor force.  The United States’ labor force increases at a steeper rate and actually converges 
with the EMU’s in 1997.  Therefore, the United States and the EMU have fulfilled the criterion 
associated with labor force for similarity of economic structure. 
Economic structure is not just limited to labor force, but also includes the unemployment 
rate.  For two or more countries to be considered optimal currency areas it is important that they 
have similar unemployment rates.  If two countries participated in a single monetary union, 
however they had vastly different unemployment rates, the monetary union’s anti-inflationary 
policies would affect the country with higher unemployment rates more adversely than it would 
affect the other country.  The magnitudes of a monetary policy may vary to such an extent that 
the two countries may suffer from asymmetric shocks.  In this paper, unemployment rates were 
found from the IMF Financial Statistics.  According to Table 5, the average unemployment rate 
from 1973 to 2003 for France, Germany, the United States, and the EMU are: 6.3%, 8.6%, 5.8%, 
and 10.6%, respectively.  Although no country’s unemployment rate is drastically out of line, it 
is important to note the spread between unemployment rates.  Figure 12 reveals the 
unemployment rate spread.  While the unemployment rate spread is 2.8% between France and 
Germany, it is 4.3% between the United States and the EMU.  This 35% increase in 
unemployment rate spread is large enough for either the United States or the EMU to be 
adversely affected by a single monetary authority’s policy regimes.  Therefore, the United States 
does not fulfill this criterion.  
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The last metric utilized in this analysis of similarity of economic structure was the 
percentage of employment among main sectors of production, agriculture, industry, and services.  
Table 6 and Figure 13 reveal the trends in employment among the United States, France, 
Germany, and the EMU.  In terms of employment in agriculture, France and Germany were more 
highly involved in agriculture than the United States.  Although the U.S. and the EMU share 
similar agricultural employment trends (decreasing and negative relationship) after 1991, the 
EMU has significantly more employment in agriculture than the United States.  In terms of 
employment in industry, both France and Germany and the United States and the EMU share a 
slightly decreasing trend.  Finally, employment in services is virtually identical across all 
analyzed countries.  France, Germany, the United States, and the EMU have positive and 
increasing employment in the service sector.  Therefore, the United States and the EMU appear 
to satisfy some, but not all, of the trade integration and similarity of economic structure 
properties.  France and Germany are definitely closer to fulfilling this OCA criterion than the 
United States and the EMU are.  
Financial Market Integration
A study conducted in March 2001, “Financial Market Integration in Europe: On the 
Effects of the EMU on Stock Markets,” the European Central Bank analyzed the degree and 
nature of integration in European equity markets and the extent to which the EMU contributed to 
the financial integration process.  The results of this paper indicate that “the degree of financial 
integration has been highly volatile over the years, but the reduced exchange rate uncertainty as 
well as monetary policy convergence of interest rates and inflation rates have been the driving 
force behind the financial integration process in Europe” (European Central Bank, 2001).
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Although financial market integration has increased market efficiency and competition, it has 
also led the participating countries in the EMU to become increasingly interdependent.  The 
European Central Bank concludes that the financial market integration in the EMU may require 
security market overseers to adopt a Euro-area-wide-approach.  
The data collected in this study corroborate the findings of the European Central Bank.  
Two metrics were utilized: the Federal Funds Rate and the percentage of GDP that is comprised 
of Foreign Direct Investment.  This data was gathered from the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators and the IMF Financial Statistics.  The Federal Funds Rate, the interest rate on 
overnight loans between banks, was utilized instead of the discount rate or interest rate because 
more data was available on it for a longer period of time.  Since the Federal Funds Rate closely 
tracks the interest rate and discount rate, it is an indicator to some degree of both business cycle 
synchronization and financial market integration.  Table 7 reveals the discount rates compared to 
the Federal Funds Rate from 1970 to 1998 (Bianco, 1999).  While in most years the discount rate 
and Federal Funds Rate differ, they have similar co-movements in that as one rate increases, so 
does the other.  Since the Federal Funds Rate is also a measure of business cycle synchronization 
it will be analyzed in a similar fashion.  Utilizing Clarke and van Wincoop’s benchmark of 0.70 
as the correlation coefficient, this analysis tests whether or not France and Germany’s correlation 
of Fed Funds Rates are equal to or greater than 0.70 for the (1973-2003) period.  If they satisfy 
this benchmark, they will be regarded as an optimal currency area and the United States and 
EMU will utilize France and Germany’s correlation coefficient as the benchmark.  If France and 
Germany do not satisfy this criterion, the United States and the EMU will utilize the 0.70 
benchmark.  
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In a general sense, the United States, France, and Germany all exhibit similar trends from 
1946 to 2003.  All three countries experience increases in Federal Funds Rates from the (1946-
1972) time period to the (1973-2003) time period.  According to Table 8, the United States’ 
Federal Funds Rate increased from 3.9% to 7.1%, France’s Federal Funds Rate increased from 
4.71% to 8.95%, and Germany’s Federal Funds Rate increased from 4.1% to 5.6%.  Upon closer 
examination of France and Germany, two important conclusions can be made.  First, France and 
Germany do appear to satisfy Clarke and van Wincoop’s correlation benchmark of 0.70.  Table 9
indicates that France and Germany experienced predicable co-movements between Federal 
Funds Rates 73.5% of the time between 1973 to 2003.  This high correlation suggests that France 
and Germany has satisfied this specific measure of financial market integration.  Second, it is 
important to note that France and Germany have not always experienced such highly correlated 
Federal Funds Rates.  From 1946 to 1972, France and Germany exhibited virtually a 0 
correlation.  Since Frankel and Rose’s (1998) research purport that monetary or currency unions 
should be closer to OCA than merely economic unions, the disciplined monetary union that 
France and Germany participated in for most of the time period of 1973 to 2003 should have 
higher correlations than from 1946 to 1972.  The data in this analysis supports Frankel and 
Rose’s findings and is consistent with the endogeneity hypothesis.  Therefore, France and 
Germany fulfilled the OCA property of financial market integration based on Federal Funds Rate 
and their history supports the endogeneity hypothesis in which the increase in trade integration 
from an instituted currency union increases the correlation of incomes or business cycles among 
the participating countries.
Although the United States’ Federal Funds Rate shows an increasing trend from 1946 to 
2003, upon a closer analysis the United States has moved further from OCA from 1946 to 2003.  
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According to Figure 14, while France and Germany became more highly correlated from (1946-
1972) to (1973-2003), the United States became increasingly less correlated with France and 
Germany.  From 1946 to 1972, the United States exhibited a 0.85 correlation with France and 
Germany.  This high correlation coefficient is most likely a direct result of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates.  From 1973 to 2003, the United States exhibits a -0.38 
correlation with the EMU.  Therefore, the United States does not fulfill an optimal currency area 
with the EMU because, utilizing France and Germany as a benchmark, the correlation of -0.38 is 
significantly less than the required 0.735.  Although the United States failed to meet this OCA 
criterion of financial market integration based on Federal Funds Rates, it too supports the 
endogeneity hypothesis.  While France and Germany’s correlation of incomes or business cycles 
increased as a result of their more disciplined economic union in the latter time period, the 
United States’ correlation of incomes or business cycles with the EMU decreased as a result of 
the United States’ independent float.
The second metric used to test financial market integration was the percentage of GDP 
that constitutes foreign direct investment.  In a study on exchange rate regimes and foreign direct 
investment, K. Niles Russ (2002) stated that uncertainty in exchange rates presents two risks for 
a foreign firm investing in another country.  The first is a “direct risk that a depreciation of the 
home currency will cause a net loss if the fixed cost is paid before monetary shocks occur.” And 
the second risk is in a “downward movement in the home country of the money supply which 
may cause a negative demand shock to sales in the home market, causing a net loss” (Russ, 
2002).  Since foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP is a measure of how extensively 
two economies are joined together, the higher the constitution of foreign direct investment in 
GDP, the more successful a fixed exchange rate system becomes.  Table 10 reveals the data 
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collected for the United States, France, Germany, and the EMU on foreign direct investment.  It 
is important to note that data was only available as far back as 1970; therefore no comparison 
can be made between the two time periods under study.  However, a number of deductions can 
be inferred.  First, France, Germany, and the EMU have a similar percentage of foreign direct 
investment in relation to GDP at 3.6%, 2.3%, and 2.6%, respectively.  The United States appears 
to lag behind with only 0.1% of its GDP comprised of foreign direct investment.  Therefore, for 
all countries under analysis, the countries exhibit a small percentage of foreign direct investment, 
and the United States appears to have the lowest.  
Although the evidence on foreign direct investment alone is not very convincing, the 
correlation of foreign direct investment is extremely in favor of financial market integration.  
According to Table 11 and Figure 15, the United States, France, Germany, and the EMU share 
predictable co-movements in terms of foreign direct investment.  While France and Germany 
have an extremely high correlation of foreign direct investment trends at 0.95, the United States 
has a significant correlation of foreign direct investment with the EMU at 0.87 as well.  In 
addition, Figure 15 is extremely convincing of the high degree of financial market integration in 
terms of foreign direct investment between France and Germany.  France and Germany’s 
percentages of GDP that is foreign direct investment seemingly mirror each other.  
Evidently, the data appears to be perplexing.  On one hand, France, Germany, and the 
United States have a very low percentage of GDP that is foreign direct investment (averaging 
less than 3.6%).  On the other hand, France, Germany, and the United States all have high 
correlations among foreign direct investment.  It is important to evaluate trends in foreign direct 
investment.  According to Table 10, France’s percentage of GDP that is foreign direct investment
increased from 0.8% in 1975 to 16.6% in 2000, Germany’s increased from 1.0% in 1971 to 
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15.1% in 2000.  However, the United States’ percentage of GDP that constitutes foreign direct 
investment did not increase as substantially.  In 1970, the United States had 0.8% of foreign 
direct investment while in 1999 it had 6.1%.  France and Germany’s significant increase in 
foreign direct investment over the past thirty years could be a result of the monetary union 
pursued by these countries and the United States’ mediocre increase in foreign direct investment 
could be attributed to its floating exchange rate regime.  In either case, France and Germany are 
more highly correlated in terms of foreign direct investment, have higher percentages of foreign 
direct investment, and show a substantial increase in foreign direct investment over time when 
compared to the United States.  This evidence indicates that France and Germany seemingly 
satisfy the OCA criterion of foreign direct investment while the United States is less likely to.
This analysis on financial market integration among the United States, France, Germany, 
and the EMU has important conclusions.  Utilizing a strict benchmark proposed by Clarke and 
van Wincoop, France and Germany exhibit synchronizations between Federal Funds Rates 
whereas the United States does not.  Although the data and analysis on FDI as a percentage of 
GDP is not as scientific, on a comparative basis the United States does not appear to be as 
integrated with the EMU as France does with Germany to warrant an optimal currency area.  
Therefore, France and Germany have fulfilled the OCA criterion of financial market integration 
when comparing these countries to the United States and the EMU.
Synchronization of Business Cycles
Business cycle synchronization is the key criterion of the OCA theory.  According to this 
theory, “if the business cycles of two countries are highly synchronized or exposed to symmetric 
shocks and exhibit similar responses to these shocks a common monetary policy response does 
46
not introduce imbalances between them” (Mundell, 1961).  The higher the symmetry is between 
shocks, the lower the cost of sharing a common monetary policy.  Since GDP increased over 
time for the United States, the EMU, France, and Germany, this analysis utilizes the percentage 
change in GDP as the basis for correlation. Utilizing Clarke and van Wincoop’s benchmark of 
0.70 as the correlation coefficient, this analysis tests whether or not France and Germany’s 
correlation of percentage changes in GDP are equal to or greater than 0.70 for the (1973-2003) 
period.  If they satisfy this benchmark, they will be regarded as an optimal currency area and the 
United States and EMU will utilize France and Germany’s correlation coefficient as the 
benchmark.  If France and Germany do not satisfy this criterion, the United States and the EMU 
will utilize the 0.70 benchmark.  
Table 12 reveals this increasing trend in GDP growth from 1946 to 2003.  From 1946 to 
2003, the average GDP for the United States increased nine-fold, the average GDP for France 
increased 14 times, the average GDP for Germany increased 7 times, and the average GDP for 
the EMU increased 5 times.  Since all countries are likely to experience an increase in GDP, the 
percentage change in GDP was utilized in this analysis.  Table 13 indicates the correlation trend.  
From 1973 to 2003, France and Germany exhibited a low correlation between the percentage 
changes in their GDPs.  A correlation of 0.32 purports that only 32% of the time did France’s 
change in GDP share a predictable co-movement with Germany’s.  Interestingly, France and 
Germany’s percentage change in GDP were more highly correlated during the (1946-1973) time 
period exhibiting a correlation of 0.57.  While this data shows that France and Germany did not 
satisfy the 0.70 hurdle rate in either period, it does reveal that France and Germany may be 
experiencing idiosyncratic shocks or may be responding asymmetrically to common shocks.  
Either way the business cycles of France and Germany have become less synchronized and 
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moved these countries farther from the OCA line.  This evidence opposes the endogeneity 
hypothesis proposed by Frankel and Rose.  During most of the time period of 1973 to 2003, 
France and Germany, specifically, pegged their currencies to each other and went even further to 
adopt the euro in January of 1999.  This suggests that the monetary or currency union 
implemented from 1973 to 2003 was a more stringent and disciplined approach than the 
economic union of the Bretton Woods system.  A more disciplined monetary arrangement, 
according to the endogeneity hypothesis, means that the economies of France and Germany 
should have become more synchronized in the latter time period.  The fact that they decrease in 
business cycle synchronization supports Krugman and Venable’s (1996) specialization 
hypothesis.  Finally, France and Germany’s correlation between percentage changes in GDP 
cannot be utilized when comparing the United States to the EMU since 0.32 is significantly less 
than 0.70.
Since France and Germany have not fulfilled this OCA criterion, an alternative 
benchmark of 0.70 must be utilized.  From Table 13 and Figure 16 it becomes quite evident that 
the United States is just shy of meeting this property.  With a correlation of 0.66 or 66.0%, the 
United States’ percentage change in GDP follows the EMU’s by only 66.0%.  This correlation 
does not satisfy the hurdle rate proposed by Clark and van Wincoop.  However, two important 
observations can be drawn from this analysis.  First, the correlation between percentage changes
in GDP has increased substantially from the time period (1946-1972) to the time period (1973-
2003).  From 1946 to 1972, the United States exhibited a mere 0.39 correlation with the EMU 
while from 1973 to 2003, the United States exhibited a significant 0.66 correlation with the EMU.  
This is counterintuitive considering that from 1946 to 1972, the United States was engaged in an
economic union under the Bretton Woods system with European countries while from 1973 to 
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2003, the United States participated in an independent exchange rate regime.  Second, the United 
States is currently more highly correlated with the EMU than the Inter-European countries of 
France and Germany are with each other.  This is further evidence in support of the 
specialization hypothesis in which a fixed exchange rate policy and increased trade integration is 
associated with a decrease in business cycle synchronization while a floating exchange rate 
policy and decreased trade integration is associated with an increase in business cycle 
synchronization.  Therefore, the United States does not fulfill Mundell’s optimal currency area 
criterion based on business cycle synchronization and evidence suggests that if the United States 
does not engage in a monetary union with the EMU, the United States will continue to increase 
its synchronization with the EMU.  
Price Flexibility
An essential adjustment mechanism for a country experiencing an idiosyncratic shock 
would be price flexibility.  If a region within a currency area experiences an asymmetric shock, 
one way of adjusting would be to reduce nominal prices.  Thus, “price level inertia” or the 
degree of “stickiness” of nominal prices is a measure of business cycle synchronization.  
Interestingly, the Commission (1990) estimated that prices are more sticky in the EU than in the 
United States, “in the event of a 1% price rise, it would take a similar rise in EU unemployment 
to prevent a rise in wages, but only a tenth of that in the U.S.”  Research (Vaubel 1976 and 1978; 
De Grauwe and Vanhavebeke 1993; von Hagen and Neumann 1994) states that “real wage and 
price levels tend to fluctuate less between regions within a currency area than between currency 
areas.”  Although this finding seems unlikely, there are many viable explanations.  The simplest 
explanation is that regions within a currency area are hopefully optimal currency areas and 
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therefore, do not experience asymmetric shocks.  If these regions do experience asymmetric 
shocks, the low responsiveness of prices may be a result of other adjustment mechanisms 
working.  Prices and percentage changes in prices from the Consumer Price Index were utilized 
to determine the degree of price stickiness and price flexibility.  Since the percentage changes in 
prices (inflation) can be regarded as an element of business cycle synchronization, Clarke and 
van Wincoop’s benchmark of 0.70 as the correlation benchmark is utilized.  The following
analysis tests whether or not France and Germany’s correlation of percentage changes in prices is
equal to or greater than 0.70 for the (1973-2003) period.  If they satisfy this benchmark, they are
regarded as having an adequate price adjustment mechanism and the United States and EMU will 
utilize France and Germany’s correlation coefficient as the benchmark.  If France and Germany 
do not satisfy this criterion, the United States and the EMU will utilize the 0.70 benchmark.  
Since the United States, France, and Germany all experienced increasing prices from 
(1946-1972) to (1973-2003), percentage changes in prices were utilized as a more accurate 
measure in this analysis (Figure 17).  The correlation of inflation rates for France and Germany 
from 1973 to 2003 was approximately 0.26 according to Tables 14 and 15.  Although this is an 
increase in price flexibility from the (1946-1972) time period (0.02), it is still relatively low and 
does not fulfill the benchmark established by Clarke and van Wincoop.  In contrast, the United 
States’ correlation of price flexibility with the EMU from 1973 to 2003 was roughly 0.51.  
Although this higher correlation suggests that the United States shares greater co-movements 
with the EMU in terms of prices than the Inter-European economies do, the correlation is too low 
to warrant an optimal currency area (it is less than 0.70).  Therefore, neither France and Germany, 
nor the United States and the EMU qualify as optimal currency areas because their changes in 
prices do not move together.  
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Not only do the price changes not move together sufficiently, but price flexibility appears 
to be limited.  Price stickiness appears to dominate in virtually all areas.  The country with the 
highest price flexibility for the (1973-2003) time period is Germany with an average price 
change of 10.4%.  Germany’s fluctuating price levels are depicted in Figure 17.  The United 
States’ average price flexibility for the (1973-2003) time period is approximately half of 
Germany’s (at 4.5%).  Two important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.  First, France 
and Germany do not have extremely flexible prices which may result from the workings of other 
adjustment mechanisms such as mobility of labor or changes in wages and unemployment.  
Second, the United States’ price levels are stickier than France and Germany’s and does not 
fulfill this OCA property.
Mobility of Labor as a Factor of Production
In order for a region to become an optimal currency area it must have certain adjustment 
mechanisms to cushion the affects of asymmetric shocks other than reducing nominal prices.  
Mobility of labor as a factor of production can play an important and even dominant role as an 
adjustment mechanism.  Recent research has concluded two main findings in regards to 
European migration versus United States migration.  First, labor mobility is generally lower in 
European countries than in the United States.  Piracha and Vickerman (2002) estimate that “the 
mobility levels in the U.S. are on average six times greater than in the United States.”  Second, 
labor mobility across European countries was found to be lower than the one within countries.  
According to a study conducted by De Grauwe and Vanhavebeke (1991), “the yearly flow of 
migrants among several Western European countries is less than 10 percent when compared with 
interregional migration.”  In a study by Puhani (1999), the elasticity of migration was estimated 
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with respect to changes in unemployment and income.  Puhani utilized regional panel data for 
three European countries: Germany, France, and Italy and concluded that “labor mobility is 
highest in Germany, but even here it would take at least four years until more than half of a 
shock of unemployment is accommodated by migration.”  Therefore, labor mobility is seen as a 
somewhat insufficient adjustment mechanism to absorb idiosyncratic shocks in the EMU.  More 
convincingly, Decressin and Fatas (1995) researched 51 U.S. states and 51 EU regions from 
1975 to 1990 and analyzed a region specific employment shock in the short-run.  This research 
indicates that the employment shock is absorbed in vastly different ways in the United States and 
in Europe:
In the United States, the migration between regions acts as an absorber, while in Europe the participation 
rate is the absorber.  More exactly, inside EU a negligible proportion of the labor demand shock is absorbed 
by migration throughout one year after the shock occurred while for the U.S. after one year the proportion
is 52 percent (Decressin and Fatas, 1995).
While this research seems surprising, it supports the data gathered in this analysis.  The data was 
gathered from Migration Source, Global Data and measures the net number of migrants over 
five year intervals from 1950 to 2000.  As evidenced in Table 16 and Figure 18, the United 
States has had vastly different migration patterns than France, Germany and the EMU.  While 
the average number of migrants over five years increased by roughly 188% from (1950-1970) to
(1970-2000) for the United States, the average number of migrants over five years decreased by 
approximately 60% for France.  In Germany, the average number of migrants over five years 
increased, but only by about 64%.  Since data on migration was not available for the EMU over 
this long a period of time, a composite index of France and Germany was utilized.  However, 
since France and Germany exhibited vastly different migration trends, the composite index 
represents more of a mean between two extremes and cannot be utilized.  From this analysis and 
current economic research it becomes evident that the mobility of labor may not be as elastic for 
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the EMU as it is for the United States.  The United States apparently does fulfill the OCA 
property for mobility of labor with the EMU.
This conclusion is surprising considering the close proximity and geography of the Inter-
European countries under study; however, it is not a novel finding.  Recent research indicates 
that the elasticity of migration is a product of wages and unemployment.  Just as high wages 
favor immigration, high unemployment rates increase emigration.  Not only are unemployment 
shocks absorbed differently between European countries and the United States, but there are a 
variety of features of labor markets in Europe which make migration difficult.  In a speech on 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union by Mark Wynne, senior economist and assistant vice 
president at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, he states, “various languages, cultural 
differences, and the lack of a large central government make transfers to distressed regions 
difficult and impede the absorption of transitory shocks.”  Although the United States does not 
share a common language or culture with the EMU, its high mobility of labor between Europe 
indicate that if it joined with the EMU to create a currency union, migration may play an 
important role in cushioning shocks. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Main Hypothesis to be Tested
Just as Milton Friedman’s idea of independent exchange rates became widely-accepted 
and the U.S. stock market hit all time highs in the late 1990s, the introduction of the euro in 1999 
combined with the currently outrageous budget deficits and weakening dollar have again brought 
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the theory of optimal currency area and fixed exchange rate regimes to the forefront of economic 
debate.  What was once thought of as unthinkable, today many economists fear will become a 
reality; that the U.S. dollar will lose its dominant currency reserve status to the euro as a result of 
American policies.  This is not the first time international reserve currencies have been replaced.  
“Over the past 2,000 years, the leading international currency has changed many times, from the 
Roman denarius via the Byzantine solidus to the Dutch guilder and then to sterling” (“The Future 
of the Dollar: The Passing of the Buck, 2004). The United States has benefited greatly over the 
past sixty years in which the dollar has existed as the leading international currency.  In the wake 
of the declining dollar, the United States may consider pegging its currency to the euro in an 
effort to decrease exchange rate uncertainty, increase trade, decrease inflation, and decrease 
unemployment.  The impact of trade cannot be underestimated.  According to an article in the 
Economist, “Trade’s Bounty” (2004), economists estimated that “the American economy is 
roughly $1 trillion a year better off thanks to ‘global integration.’  That means about $9,000 of 
extra income for each American household.”
While trade has taken an increasingly important role in global economies and a fixed 
exchange rate system is likely to increase trade and stimulate economic growth, not all areas are 
optimal for a monetary union.  By utilizing Robert Mundell’s optimal currency criteria, two 
conclusions have been inferred through this analysis.  In some cases France and Germany could 
not be utilized as benchmarks for the United States and the EMU because they, as founding 
members of the EMS and EMU, did not satisfy optimality.  Second, the United States appears to 
be farther from optimality than France and Germany are currently.  
France and Germany as an Optimal Currency Area
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The idea that France and Germany are not an optimal currency area has been proposed by 
many economists.  In fact, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) even went so far as to suggest that 
the United States and the EMU are more correlated than the Inter-European economies of Europe.  
The stunted performance of the euro and EMU after its immediate introduction may be a direct 
result of this lack of synchronization across European economies.  From the analysis undertaken 
in this study, France and Germany fulfilled some, but not all, of the optimality criteria to be 
deemed an OCA region by Mundell.  Table 17 reveals a synopsis of the results.  According to 
this research, on a comparative basis from 1973 to 2003, France and Germany satisfied the 
following properties: degree of economic openness, trade integration and similarity of economic 
structure, and financial market integration.  These countries did not fulfill business cycle 
synchronization, price flexibility, and mobility of labor as a factor of production.  Not only have 
France and Germany failed to meet key adjustment mechanisms for a currency union, but it is 
unlikely that they will satisfy these criteria in the near future.  Specifically, price flexibility and 
mobility of labor appear to be problematic areas for Inter-European economies.  The stickiness 
of prices and the lack of migration that prevails within Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 
indicate that it may be a while before France and Germany actually meet optimality.  Although 
the EMU has not suffered drastically poor macroeconomic performance as a result of a lack of 
synchronization, its thwarted growth is most likely a result of asymmetric shocks affecting 
certain countries and a lack of proper adjustment mechanisms.
Stabilization between the United States and EMU
Consistent with conjecture, the United States appears to be farther away from optimality
with the EMU than France does with Germany.  Although a stabilized exchange rate system 
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would have some inherent benefits, the costs of this exchange rate system significantly 
outweighs the benefits since the U.S. is far from being a region of optimality with Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union.  Of the six criteria analyzed, the United States only fully met 
one, mobility of labor as a factor of production.  While the United States was close to fulfilling 
similarity of economic structure and financial market integration, it did not satisfy these criteria 
enough to merit meeting these OCA properties.  In addition, the United States did not meet some 
critical criteria such as: business cycle synchronization, price flexibility, degree of economic 
openness, and trade integration.  Although the United States is an active trade partner, the 
economies of France and Germany rely on each other for imports and exports far more than the 
United States does with EMU countries.  By not having enough trade integration with the EMU 
countries, the United States would unfairly be subject to one monetary regime that may help 
EMU countries, but severely damage the U.S. economy.  To stabilize the declining dollar as a 
result of the growing budget deficit and increased inflation, the United States may attempt an 
intermediate exchange rate policy rather than a rigid fixed one.  Intermediate policies such as 
target zones or basket pegs eradicate some exchange rate uncertainty and curb large fluctuations. 
Endogeneity Hypothesis or Specialization Hypothesis
This study tests Krugman and Venable’s (1996) specialization hypothesis and Frankel 
and Rose’s (1998) endogeneity hypothesis by comparing two time periods when different 
exchange rate regimes existed.  Since these hypotheses are only relevant for those properties 
dealing with business cycle correlations, financial market integration, business cycle 
synchronization, and price flexibility can be analyzed in this study.  According to Table 17, 
financial market integration supported the endogeneity hypothesis, business cycle
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synchronization supported the specialization hypothesis, and price flexibility supported neither 
the endogeneity hypothesis nor the specialization hypothesis.  Since neither the endogeneity 
hypothesis nor the specialization hypothesis dominates, it can be argued that the synchronization 
of business cycles is not only affected by the degree of trade integration or economic openness, 
but perhaps by other exogenous variables.  
Further Research
Although this thesis examines whether or not the United States should engage in a 
stabilization of exchange rates with the EMU by analyzing the various properties proposed by 
Mundell, there remain a number of areas for further research.  First, the adoption of a fixed 
exchange rate system could be analyzed from a capital and labor markets perspective.  Second, 
there is evidence that the OCA theory does not discriminate among its criteria and forces the use 
of all criteria in every case.  Tal Sadeh, in his paper, “Managing a Common Currency: Political 
and Cultural Preferences” (2002), argues that different countries and cultures regard the different 
services that money provides with varying degrees of importance.  In essence, the OCA theory 
views money as only for two purposes: a medium of account against the service it provides and a 
macroeconomic policy tool.  According to Sadeh, OCA neglects the variety of service money 
provides, which includes but is not limited to; serving as a medium of account, a medium of 
exchange, a store of value, a precautionary device, a factor of production, a taxing device, and a 
macroeconomic tool.  Therefore, further research may want to focus on potential members of 
currency unions and the relative importance of the different services that money provides.  
Finally, as evident in the above comparative analysis, determining OCA is not a black and white 
matter.  In some cases, it is not very scientific.  This unscientific nature of optimal currency area 
57
theory is one of its biggest downfalls.  According to Vaubel (1976-78), “There is no operational 
scientific method of measuring and comparing the costs and benefits of currency unification for a 
given group of countries.”  Likewise, Willett (1994) states, “the theory of optimum currency 
areas points to many relevant considerations, but not with a level of operational precision that 
would lead informed economists to always reach the same conclusions.”  Thus, further research 
could be collected on member countries that have formed a successful currency union and have 
fulfilled OCA criteria.  Characteristics and properties of these member countries could be used as 
benchmarks to create a more scientific approach to OCA.  
The findings of this thesis validate the importance of examining the various exchange 
rate systems at such a crucial time in the American economy.  Britain was the world’s largest 
creditor in 1913 and only forty years later, after two world wars and economic problems, it was 
usurped by the U.S. dollar and became a net debtor.  American policymakers are worried that as 
the budget increases along its profligate path, the dollar too will be taken over.  As evidenced in 
this study, the dollar most likely will not be totally usurped and one world currency will unlikely 
dominate.  However, a sharp decrease in the dollar would result in rising U.S. interest rates and a 
potential stagnant economy.  Further research using the optimal currency area criteria, discussed 
in this paper, and concrete benchmarks based on regions that have fulfilled OCA properties will 
further illuminate the United States’ exchange rate policy and the likely costs of the U.S. 
implementing a system of stabilization with the EMU.
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